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Abstract 
Agricultural distress in the 1920s is routinely quoted among the causes of the Great 
Depression. This paper challenges the conventional wisdom. World agriculture was 
not plagued by overproduction and falling terms of trade. The indebtedness of 
American farmers, a legacy of the boom years 1919-1921, did jeopardize the rural 
banks, but the relation between their crises, the banking panic of 1930 and the Great 
Depression is tenuous at best.   
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Introduction 
 
The Great Depression of 1929 is arguably the major peace-time macroeconomic 
shock in world economy since the start of modern economic growth. From 1929 to 
1933, the GDP per capita fell by a third in the United States and by about 9% in the 
whole Atlantic economy (Western Europe and its off-shoots) and the crisis had far-
reaching political and social consequences1. In spite of decades of research, its causes 
remain still controversial: not by chance, Bernanke has felicitously called the issue the 
“Holy Grail” of macroeconomics 2. Why did a recession start in 1929 and, above all, 
what did transform a mild downturn into the worst economic crisis since the Industrial 
Revolution, with far-reaching political consequences?  
   Most of the answers to these questions can be framed in two different interpretative 
traditions, the “real”  or ET story (from the names of its main proponents, 
Eichengreen and Temin) and the “monetary” story3.  Although disagreeing on most 
issues, they share a negative view of the conditions of agriculture during the “the 
roaring Twenties”. Temin states that, after the War, “agriculture had gone from 
prosperity to poverty” 4. However, the two traditions single out different sources of 
weakness: the “real” story focuses on the disequilibrium between supply and demand 
in the world market, and the “monetary” one on the high level of debt of American 
farmers. These shortcomings allegedly made agriculture vulnerable to the initial price 
downturn and its crisis was a key component of the economy-wide depression. This 
stylized fact is routinely repeated in general books about the economy of the interwar 
years: for instance, according to  P. Clavin, “the troubled health of agriculture, 
especially in eastern and southern Europe, was the most serious drag on European 
economic growth” 5. 
                                                 
1 Data from Maddison, World economy . See for the list of countries of the Atlantic economy 
Table 3. 
2 Bernanke Essays  p.vii 
3 Cf. for some additional references Balderston “Introduction” pp.1-6 for the “real”  story and 
Calomiris ”Financial factors” and Randall “An overview” pp.9-14 for the monetary one. 
4 Temin Lessons p.11 and 55. Cf. also  Temin Did monetary forces  p.2 and pp.146-148  
5 Clavin The Great Depression pp. 78. Cf. also Kindleberger The world pp.70-74 and 90-92, 
Romer “World War One” p.110, Pollard Peaceful conquest pp.500-01, Eichengreen Golden 
fetters p.227, Bairoch Victoires vol. III pp. 36-38; Koning The failure pp.163-184, Foreman-
Peck A history pp.187-188, Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo  European economy pp. 71-76, 
James The end pp. 63 and 105, Sheingate The rise pp. 76-77 and Findlay and O’Rourke 
“Commodity market” p. 44-45. 
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 This article challenges this view. The conditions of agriculture on the eve of the 
Depression, although far from ideal, were not as bad as suggested by the received 
wisdom. Therefore, the collapse of agricultural prices in 1930-1933 and the ensuing 
devastating crisis were not a necessary consequence of the farmers’ behaviour in the 
previous decade. Given the clear distinction among the two stories, they will be dealt 
with in two separate sections.  The next one argues that evidence on prices, stocks and 
production before 1929 does not show any major disequilibrium. Section three deals 
with the “monetary” story:  the indebtedness of American farmers did jeopardize the 
rural banks, but the causal relation between their crises, the nationwide panic of 1930 
and the Great Depression is tenuous at best. Section four concludes, by discussing the 
possible causes of the collapse in relative agricultural prices during the Depression.  
 
II) Agricultural “overproduction” and the Depression: the “real” story 
II.1 The causes of the depression  
   According to the “real” story, agriculture contributed both to the outbreak of the 
Depression in 1929 and to its catastrophic worsening in the second half of 1930 
because it was plagued by a structural disequilibrium between supply and demand. In 
the short-run, the downturn was accelerated by the parlous condition of the balance of 
payments of agricultural exporters such as Australia or Argentina in 1929. 
Timoshenko blamed mainly the poor 1929 crop, which reduced their exports, while 
Lewis and Eichengreen stress the effect of the American monetary squeeze of 1928 
on these heavily indebted countries6.  The drying-out of capital imports forced these 
countries first to liquidate their stocks of primary products, starting a downward fall in 
agricultural prices, and ultimately to abandon gold standard. On a different vein, 
Hamilton shows that future markets, usually quite efficient in predicting agricultural 
prices, spectacularly erred throughout the Great Depression, and Siklos speculates that 
the (unanticipated) price fall in 1929 might have triggered the Depression 7.  
   The alleged disequilibrium was however a long-run problem, dating back to the war 
8. Since then, demand had been growing slowly, as the consumption of agricultural 
                                                 
6 Timoshenko, World agriculture pp. 66-76, Lewis Economic survey p. ?? and Eichengreen 
Golden fetters pp.227-228.  
7 Hamilton “Was the deflation” pp. 158-162 and Siklos “Understanding” pp. 35-36. Hamilton 
shows how the (poor) predictions of future markets for agricultural commodities shaped also 
expectation about aggregate price level. 
8 The gist of this interpretation was put forward in two major works by the League of Nations, 
The agricultural crisis (which voiced the opinions by agricultural experts from some thirty 
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products was price and income-inelastic, and the European population was increasing 
much less than before the war. In contrast, productive capacity had increased a lot, 
especially during World War One in overseas countries, for the combination of 
technical progress (mainly mechanization) and of the increase in inputs (land and 
capital). Different authors emphasize demand or supply-side factors in creating the 
disequilibrium, but they agree on the consequences. The additional production either 
ended up in stocks, financed with short-term loans, or, given the low elasticity of 
demand for food, caused prices of agricultural products to decline well before the 
outbreak of the Depression. A decade of “structural deflation”, to use Kindleberger’s 
words, had made farmers in the Atlantic economy highly vulnerable to any additional 
decrease in prices, even a relatively mild one 9. In 1929-1930, farmers were forced to 
liquidate stocks, causing prices to spiral downwards. In a recent paper, Madsen sums 
up nicely this conventional wisdom: “the overproduction of agricultural products and 
the mounting stocks made agricultural prices vulnerable to shocks in demand, 
international lending and the international financial system”10.  
   How did the fall in agricultural prices cause the worsening of the Depression? 
Agrarian economists in the early 1930s used a proto-Keynesian argument: the fall in 
farmers’ income reduced economy-wide demand.  Lewis pointed out that fall in prices 
benefited consumers – so that the net effect on domestic demand was likely to be 
small 11. He stressed that the decrease in prices created expectations of further decline, 
depressing investments, and reduced the purchasing power of exporters of primary 
products. As Eichengreen puts it, the ensuing contraction in exports was “another nail 
in the coffin of American prosperity”. These words seem to downplay the role of 
agriculture in the Depression. However, according to  Madsen’s econometric 
estimates, it had a huge impact. The fall in absolute agricultural prices from 1929 to 
1933 accounted for almost all the deflation and that the fall in relative agricultural 
                                                                                                                                            
countries) and  The course and phases (a report written by Bertil Ohlin, with the advice of 
other eminent economists such as Hayek or von Morgestern) and in the highly influential book 
by Timoshenko World agriculture pp. 8-32. Cf. also Genung The agricultural depression p.21, 
Arndt The economic lessons   pp.10-12, Lewis, Economic survey pp.??? Cf. the more 
skeptical view Aldcroft From Versailles pp. 223-228 and Bernstein Great Depression pp. 9-12 
and 103. 
9 Kindleberger, The world, p.93. 
10 Madsen Agricultural crises  p.356 
11 Lewis, Economic survey pp. ??  Cf. in the same vein Fleising “The United States”, Aldcroft, 
From Versailles p.236 and also Kindleberger The world p.91. Temin (Lessons p.56) suggests 
that the net domestic effect might have even been positive. The quotation is from 
Eichengreen, Golden fetters, p.246 
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prices accounted directly for a sizeable share of the decrease in aggregate demand 
(about a half for consumption and between one fourth and one third for investment) 
12.   
    This paper will not deal with the effects of the disequilibrium on the unfolding of 
the Depression, nor with will try to assess the relative importance of overproduction 
versus slo growth in demand. The paper will instead will focus on the very existence 
of a disequilibrium, which is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the 
whole “real” story. To this aim, it will look at the evidence on prices, production and 
stock in the 1920s.  Before discussing the available data, it is necessary to stress how 
narrowly focused the traditional narrative is. First, it deals almost exclusively with the 
countries of the Atlantic economy. African and Asian countries appear only as 
supplier of selected tropical imports, such as coffee and rubber. One can justify this 
focus to the extent that the Great Depression originated in those countries and affected 
only later, although very heavily, the rest of the world economy. Second, even the 
coverage of products of temperate agriculture is decidedly selective, in all likelihood 
according to the available data. Cereals and industrial crops have a paramount role 
while livestock products are given very little attention. Last but not least, the 
existence of the disequilibrium is mainly inferred from the decline in nominal prices 
and the increase in stocks for specific commodities. Production data are seldom 
quoted, and sometimes dismissed, as they do not show any spectacular increase in the 
1920s, with the exception of rubber and perhaps silk.  
 
 II.2 The evidence: prices 
  The data on relative prices do not confirm the conventional wisdom. Graph 1 reports 
the index of world agricultural terms of trade (ratio of prices of agricultural products 
to the unit values of manufactures) by Grilli and Yang since 1900, the starting point of 
the series13. Prices have been rising throughout the first decade of the20th century, 
peaking in 1917, ad then collapsed.  
 
                                                 
12 Madsen Agricultural crises. The figures are obtained from the coefficients of a set of 
dynamic equations for fifteen countries in 1929-1936. They refer to the direct effect only, 
omitting the additional effects via the depression of land prices and the reduction in farmer’s 
wealth. 
13 The agricultural prices index is a weighted average of indices for food (0.85) and nonfood 
agricultural raw materials  (0.15).  
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Terms of trade of world agriculture, 1900-1938
(1911=100)
 
Source: Grilli and Yang “Primary commodity prices” Appendix one 
 
   The terms of trade fell by a half in four years, and then recovered, but only partially. 
On the eve of the Great Depression, the average was some 15% lower than in 1910-
13. This comparison is somewhat unfair, as the pre-war prices were historically very 
high. Indeed, the 1910-14 price level (“parity”) was to assume a mythical status in the 
following years: achieving it became the goal of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the 
cornerstone of the New Deal agricultural policy. In fact, the “terms of trade” in the 
late 1920s were still 10% higher than in the early 1900s.  
  Grilli and Yang are very economical with details of the computation of their indices. 
However, methods of computation can matter, as graph 2 shows. It reports five series 
of agricultural prices for the United States, which are computed as ratios of different 
basic series  (farm-gate prices, wholesale price indices, implicit GDP deflators).  
 
 8 
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935
Received/living
Received/inputs
Market/implicit GDP
Market/inputs
Market/all commodities
Graph 2
Real agricultural prices, USA 1910-1938
 
 Sources:  “Received” (prices received by farmers)  Historical statistics  series K344; 
“Living” (prices paid by farmers for living) Historical statistics  series K347; “Inputs” 
(prices paid by farmers for production) Historical statistics  series K348; “Market” 
(market prices of farm products from the Bureau of Labor Statistics) Historical 
Statistics series E42; “Implicit GDP” (implicit GDP deflator) Balke and Gordon 
“Estimation”  tab. 10; “All commodities” (market prices for all commodities from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics) Historical Statistics series E23. 
 
 
  These series, with one exception, show that agricultural prices on the eve of the 
Great Depression were back to their pre-war level. These data cast serious doubts 
about the conventional wisdom about price trends. The war-time cycle (peaking in 
1919) was as wide as the Great Depression, but the long-term trends have been 
essentially flat 14.   
 What about other countries?  Table 1 reports data on terms of trade (ratio of prices 
agricultural products/manufactures) and real prices (prices of agricultural 
                                                 
14 The rates of growth (computed with linear interpolation) for 1910-1929 are received/living –
0.67 (not significant), received/inputs  0.03 (not significant), market/implicit GDP –1.98 
(significant 5%),  market/inputs 0.05 (not significant) and market/all commodities  0.09 (not 
significant). The rate is –1.54 (significant at 15%) for the Grilli-Yang series.   
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products/overall price indexes) for as many countries of the Atlantic economy as 
possible.  As expected, the terms of trade move more than real prices, which include 
the agricultural products also in the denominator. The table shows a wide variety of 
country trends, which reflect differences in coverage and methods of estimation. Yet, 
most series conform to the American pattern: prices declined or stagnated during the 
war-time cycle and grew in the 1920s. The prices in 1927-1929 were indeed lower 
than in 1910-1913 in a majority of countries, but in few cases only the difference 
exceeded 10%. As shown in the column e), in three countries only (all in Europe) 
there was a statistically significant downward trend. In all other cases, short-term 
fluctuations swamped long-term trends. Thus, in almost all the countries of the 
Atlantic economy, on the eve of the Great Depression, real prices of agricultural 
products were at their historical maximum or close to it.  Price trends were even more 
favourable in the rest of the world 15.  In short, there was no large-scale “structural 
deflation” in the 1920s. Nor there was a widespread worsening in 1929, which could 
account for the outbreak of the Depression à la Timoshenko/Eichengreen. From 1928 
to 1929 the terms of trade did fall in Argentina (by 6%) and Uruguay (by 2%), and in 
the majority of European countries but they improved in Canada and Australia, as 
well as in the United States. These modest changes in prices contrast with the 
veritable collapse after the outbreak of the Great Depression (Graph 2 and col. f of 
Table 1): this fall is likely to have influenced the perception of pre-crisis experience. 
 II.3 Production and stocks 
  At a first glance, the available data on stocks seem to be a strong evidence for the 
conventional wisdom. Both the series by Timoshenko (from 1923 onwards) and the 
League of Nations (from 1925 onwards) show a fast increase in the late 1920s, at 
yearly growth rate of 7.5% and 11.3% respectively 16. However, these indices are 
seriously flawed. First, they cover a small set of products, such as cereals, textile 
fibres and tropical products, which happened to be the most subject to the (alleged) 
overproduction17. Second, the basic series may be not representative. Most of them 
                                                 
15 From 1911-13 to 1927-29 terms of trade improved in Punjab (+19%) Thailand (+11%) India 
(+4.5%) Korea (+4%) and Japan, while they decrease in Egypt (-1%), China (-1.2%) and 
above all Taiwan (-45%).  
16 Timoshenko World agriculture tab.10 and League of Nations Memorandum 1938-39. Both 
sources reports estimate for different dates of the year. The growth rates in the text are 
computed with June 1 indexes for the period 1925-1929. 
17 At least in the case of Timoshenko’s index this effect is worsened by a bizarre weighting, 
which bears no relationship at all with the composition of agricultural production. Textile 
material (cotton and raw silk) account for 40.4% of total, tea, coffee and sugar for 36.8% and 
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refer to so called “visible supply”, the stocks in ports and public warehouses 
(sometimes only in some countries/markets). They omit stock held by farmers, by 
traders in their own warehouses and by processing industries. According to the 
League of Nations, the ratio of visible stocks to “world total stocks”  increased for 
wheat and sugar (but not for cotton) – and therefore the latter overvalues the actual 
growth in inventories18. Last but not least, the late 1920s inventories were not 
exceptional if compared with production or consumption. Wheat stocks accounted on 
average for 14.7% of world output from 1922 to 1928, while from 1890 to 1913 they 
had amounted to 17.6% of production 19. Inventories rose to 24.5% in 1929, after the 
1928 bumper stock and remained around a quarter of output throughout the 1930s.  
  The information on productive capacity (Table 2) are scarce, but the 1910s and 
1920s do not seem featured by a reckless expansion. The number of workers remained 
stable or even declined in most countries, capital increased by 5-10% and only the 
stock of land in few overseas countries was clearly on the rise. But this increase was 
at least partially compensated by the disappearance of Russian supply from the world 
market after the Revolution20. Thus the posited growth in productive capacity had to 
be achieved with a substantial increase in total factor productivity and there is no 
evidence of an acceleration in the pace of technical progress after World War One  21. 
From this point of view, the real watershed was to be World War Two.  
 This slow increase in productive capacity is consistent with the data on production. 
Table 3 reports the series computed by the League of Nations in the 1920s and 1930s 
and the results of a new research, which is based on yearly data for 25 countries at 
their 1913 borders. The data-base covers entirely the  Atlantic economy, plus Eastern 
Europe (Russia and Austria-Hungary) and several South American and Asian 
                                                                                                                                            
wheat for the remaining 22.2%. The League of Nations does not provide information on the 
weighting of its series. 
18 From 1925 to 1929, the ratio for cotton remained stable, while those for wheat and sugar 
grew from 43% to 51% and from 34% to 48% respectively (League of Nations Memorandum 
1938-39).  
19 Output from Bennet “World wheat crops”, Davies “The world wheat situation” tab. I and 
Farnsworth  “Wheat in the fourth year” tab. II (the series exclude Russia), stock of wheat at 
August 1 from Farnsworth “World wheat stocks” tab.1. The author points out (pp.57-58) that 
the increase of the share of output from the Southern hemisphere increased the equilibrium 
stock/output ratio. The stocks were not unusually large in proportion to output for coffee as 
well. The ratio was 50.5% in 1883-1913 (Ukers All about coffee p.274) and 37.6% on average 
in 1923-1929 (League of Nations The agricultural crisis tab.IX).  It rose to 84.6% in 1928-29, 
which anyway was not the highest on record. 
20 Russia accounted for 12% of “world” gross output in 1913 (Federico “The growth” tab.5). 
21 Federico, Feeding, chap.5. The sources of the 1930s often quote mechanization as a major 
change brought about by the war, but by 1930 there were only 130000 tractors in all Europe 
and about 300000 in the United States.    
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countries. All series refer to gross output (the total production available for human 
consumption or industrial processing after the deductions for seeds, cattle feeding and 
other farm uses) but the League of Nations omits dairy and meat, possibly biasing 
downward the outcome. As clear from Table 3, there were some substantial 
differences in performance among areas, but clearly production did not increase fast. 
On the eve of the Depression, gross output was about 15-20% higher than before the 
war. This increase is far from impressive.  In the twenty years from the early 1890s to 
1911-1913, a period which is widely regarded as a golden era for farmers, “world” 
production grew by a third, doubling in the countries of Western Settlement. If the 
1870-1913 growth rate had been sustained in the 1910s and 1920s, by 1929 the output 
would have been about 10% higher than the actual one 22.  
 II.4 An estimate of  the disequilibrium 
  The disequilibrium can be computed, for the year t, as  
Rt=St/Dt     1) 
where S is an index of productive capacity and D is an index of potential demand – all 
expressed as a ratio to an equilibrium year. The data on productive capacity are too 
scarce to estimate S, which thus will be proxied with actual production. This is 
tantamount to assume that productive capacity was fully utilized and short-term 
fluctuations of output reflected only the vagaries of weather. The potential demand is 
computed as 
D=P*Cp   2) 
where P is population and Cp is per capita consumption of agricultural products, 
Cp=A*Ya* ? ß    3) 
 where A is a survival bundle of consumption (constant over time), Y is GDP per 
capite, ?  an index of “world” real prices of agricultural products and a and ß are the 
relevant elasticities.  
   The equilibrium year is assumed to be 1911. The baseline estimate of R (Tab.4 
column b) is the ratio of aggregate production of the Atlantic economy (Table 3) to 
the baseline estimate of demand (Table 4 column a). This latter is computed by 
assuming a moderately inelastic demand, with a 0.6 and ß –0.3 23. Clearly, there was 
                                                 
22 Cf. Federico “The growth” tab.4. 
23 The index of real prices is computed as a weighted average of country series of table 4, 
plus the ratio of  food/consumer prices in the United States (Historical statistics series  E 
137/E135).  These countries are fairly representative, as they accounted for about 85% of the 
population of the “Atlantic” economy. The national indices are weighted with population: using 
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no “overproduction”: if any, production was inferior to potential demand. The other 
columns of table 3 show that this result is quite robust to changes in assumptions. 
Column c) uses the index of production by the League of Nations, column d) assumes 
zero price elasticity and column e) assumes both income and price elasticity to have 
been zero –i.e. that aggregate demand changed only as much as population. Only in 
this last case, an extreme version of Lewis’s scenario, actual production did exceed 
potential demand all over the 1920s, with a widening gap. However, the assumption 
of zero income and price elasticities does not seem really plausible for the whole 
agricultural demand, which included “luxuries” such as sugar, coffee and livestock 
products. 24 Finally, column f) refers to wheat only – the product most affected by 
overproduction according to the conventional wisdom25. Total production of the 
Atlantic economy did exceed demand only since 1926. On top of this, the estimate is 
biased upwards by the omission of imports from Russia, which in 1911 accounted for 
about 8-9% of supply of the Atlantic economy.26 Adding imports from Russia to the 
equilibrium production level would reduce S and therefore R. This latter would 
exceed one only in 1927-1928. 
 II.4 The “real” story: an assessment. 
 The statistical evidence discussed so far refers to agriculture as a whole, and thus it 
does not rule out differences by crop. According to Grilli and Yang, in the late 1920s, 
                                                                                                                                            
the country shares on gross output in 1913 (Federico “The growth” tab. 6) instead does not 
affect the results. These series are wholesale prices, and thus they might not be 
representative of retail ones, which consumers faced. It is for instance possible that falls in 
prices of raw products such as wheat did not pass trough to consumers for the rise in 
processing costs (wages etc.) and/or for the market power of food companies. In the Unites 
States, the price of bread fluctuated much less than that of wheat (Historical Statistics series 
E 188 and K 508). The divergence between wholesale and retail prices was a major concern 
for agricultural experts (League of Nations The agricultural crisis). The GDP and population 
are from Maddison The world economy 
24 As an alternative, one could hypothesize that elasticity was positive, but consumers 
adjusted spending to their expected permanent income. Clearly, no one could have predicted 
the Great Depression – so permanent income in the 1920s could be computed as the 
average of the years 1921-1929 or as an interpolation of income growth in the same years. In 
both cases, the production/demand ratio is lower than in the baseline case.   
25 The wheat production is computed summing up gross output in Argentine, Australia, 
Canada, the United States, Belgium, Denmark, Finland France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom, plus 
imports from Russia (Stern, ". All the data are from Mitchell, International historical statistics 
tab. D2  – except Belgium (Blomme, The economic development ), Italy (ISTAT Sommario) 
Portugal (Lains, personal communication). Prices are proxied by the ratio of price of wheat in 
the United States (Historical Statistics series K 508) to wholesale price index (series E 53). 
The elasticities are assumed 0.2 to income and –0.1 to prices. The “overproduction” 
disappears totally if  the Atlantic demand is compared with the total world production, from 
Bennett “World wheat crops”.  
26 Stern “A series”. 
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the “terms of trade” for agricultural raw materials were 30% lower than before the 
war27. In the United States, the real prices of cereals (and also of meat) never regained 
the pre-war level, while those of dairy products, fruits and even cotton in the late 
1920s did exceed it 28. In most countries livestock products fared better than crops 29. 
The effect on farmers’ incomes depended on the scope for substitution among 
products. This substitution was limited in some cases by  environmental constraints 
(climate, lack of irrigation water) or, for tree-crops such as rubber, by the lag between 
planting and the start of commercial production 30. However, in most cases, the 
elasticity of substitution was high enough: the share of livestock products on total 
gross output was rising in most countries and in the “world” total 31. The same 
reasoning holds true for exporting countries: only few of them were inescapably 
trapped with the wrong specialization. On top of this, exporting countries were not yet 
seriously damaged by European protectionism. In fact, tariffs in the 1920s were lower 
than on the eve of World War One: according to Liepmann, the average duty on 
cereals was lower in 1913 than in 1927 in nine countries out of fifteen, including 
France and Italy 32. On the other hand, disadvantaged farmers (and countries) 
complained loudly, and their plight loom large in the traditional account of the crisis.   
  Summing up, the evidence rules out a major disequilibrium.  This result  failure to 
find evidence of disequilibrium should not be really surprising, if one considers the 
behaviour of farmers in Western settlement countries implicit in the traditional story. 
They allegedly increased their productive capacity under the twin assumption that 
demand was to increase as fast as before the war and, crucially, that European 
                                                 
27 Grilli and Yang “Primary commodity prices” 
28 Prices of corn, wheat and cotton from Historical Statistics series K504, K508 and K 555 
other products Strauss-Bean “Gross farm income” series 85, 86 and 90; all prices deflated 
with the index of prices paid by farmers for living Historical Statistics  K347  
29 Cf. Federico Feeding the world tab.3.7. 
30  The production of the trees planted in the boom years of the early 1920s glutted the market 
in the late 1920s (Aldcroft From Versailles pp.228-229). Even if the initial investment in 
plantation was totally amortized, plantations should not have continued to produce if prices 
did not cover variable costs. 
31 The share of livestock products on total “world” output increased from 43.6% in 1911-1913 
to 45.8% in 1928-1930. The sum of fruits, dairy/eggs and meat increased from 62.2% of US 
gross output in 1919-21 to 70.1% in 1928-30 (data from Strauss-Bean “Gross farm output”  
tab 10 and 27). 
32 Liepmann Tariff levels  tab AI (potential tariff levels). The duty was also lower in 1927 than 
in  1913 in the majority of countries for fruit and vegetables, while it was higher for the other 
categories such as livestock, animal foodstuff and other foodstuffs. The differences were 
anyway quite small. Furthermore,  barriers to trade were even lower in the early 1920s 
(League of Nations, Agricultural crisis pp.17-21, Clavin The Great Depression pp.81-86, 
Federico, Feeding the world). 
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agriculture was to be unable to satisfy it. One can admit a collective error in 
prediction under the exceptional war-time circumstances, but the conventional 
wisdom implies that they went on erring throughout the 1920s, even after the great 
shock of 1920-1921 and the return to normalcy in international economic relations. 
They would have gone on increasing their productive capacity and output, betting on 
a price rebound, which did not materialize. Such a collective misjudgement is hardly 
credible, especially as farmers had the option to migrate to cities, where the economic 
growth offered plenty of job opportunities33. The behaviour of farmers would be 
perfectly rational if prices had remained stable in the long run. This seems to have 
been the case: all the evidence suggests a slow but steady growth in production 
matching the slow but steady growth in demand.  
   
III) Agriculture and the Depression: the “monetary” story 
 III.1 The “monetary” story 
  As is well-known, the modern “monetary” interpretation of the Great Depression 
was initiated by Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz in their classic book A 
monetary history of the United States. They dismiss the effects of the events of 1929 
and argue that the real turning point of the crisis was the banking panic of October 
1930. It triggered the Great Depression by causing a substantial and unexpected 
reduction in the money stock which the Federal Reserve was unable or unwilling to 
contain 34. In a more recent version of this “monetary” story, Bernanke stresses the 
negative effects of the fall in supply of banking services and the more cautious 
lending policy of surviving institutions 35. They worsened the depression by forcing 
households to save more and consume less. In both versions, had not the banking 
panic not happened, the initial downturn would not have turned into a disastrous 
depression. Agriculture might have played a role in the panic via the effect of 
farmers’ indebtedness on the conditions of the banking system.  Indebtedness could 
cause a nationwide banking panic  if i) indebtedness caused a substantial number of 
farmers to fail, ii) these failures caused banks which had financed farmers to fail and 
                                                 
33 In the United States, the market for labor was well integrated in the 1920s ((Alston and 
Hatton “The earnings gap”) and 0.63 millions farmers migrated to cities each year from 1921 
to April 1930 (Historical Statistics series C 78).  
34 Friedman and Schwartz A monetary history pp. 299-311 and 338-341. Cf. the reappraisal 
by Hamilton “The causes” by Cole and Ohanian “The Great Depression” pp.16-19. 
35 Bernanke Essays pp.46-62 
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iii) the failure of rural banks either triggered the panic (a case of strong exogeneity) or 
helped to propagate it (weak exogeneity).  
  Before testing these three conditions, this section will illustrate briefly the situation 
of American farmers in the 1920s, in order to reconstruct the origins of their 
indebtedness. Consistently with the overall “monetary” story, it will focus uniquely 
on the USA, although the connection between indebtedness and banking panics 
elsewhere is worth of research. In fact, farmers were quite heavily indebted also in 
other countries – notably Germany-   and the occurrence of a banking panic in a 
country worsened its performance during the Depression 36. 
 
III.2 The gathering of the storm: farmers’ income and indebtedness in the 1920s 
    As graph 3 shows, the income of American farmers fluctuated a lot in the 1920s.  
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Graph 3
Real farm income, USA 1910-1938
(1911=100)
 
Sources: GDP per capita Maddison, World economy; Agricultural wages: earnings for 
farm employees (HS D739) deflated with prices paid for living (HS K347); Farmers’ 
incomes: farmers’ income (HS K284) deflated with prices paid for living (HS K347) 
37. 
                                                 
36 Cf. Bernanke Essays pp. 26-28 and on German indebtedness League of Nations The 
agricultural crisis pp.171-172  
37 The series (“realized net income of farm operators from farming”) omits income from non-
farm work and capital gains and losses from the change in inventories. Cf. also the income 
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 They had profited handsomely from war-time boom and were hit extremely hard by 
the fall in prices 38.  From 1917 to 1921, their real income fell by 55% - i.e. as much as 
from 1929 to 1932.  In the 1920s, it crawled back, and at the end of the decade it was 
back to the  pre-war level. However farmers had lost ground relative the rest of the 
economy and also relative to their own employees. The GDP per capita was 30% 
higher than before the war (series b) and the agricultural wages were some 10% 
higher than farmers’ income. This difference with their own employees may have 
affected the farmers’ status and self-perception more than the comparison with far-
away city dwellers. But on the eve of the Depression, the farmers’ conditions were not 
terrible, although surely not very good. The gap with agricultural workers and the rest 
of the economy was to widen during the Depression – just to ounce back with the 
New Deal and the Agricultural Adjustment Act.     
   The worst legacy of the early 1920s was however a massive worsening in the 
financial conditions of American farmers. From 1919 to 1921 their net wealth 
decreased by more than 9 billions (1911) dollars – i.e. by 1.3 times the initial output 
39. About one third of this sum reflects a decrease in net savings and the rest the 
increase in indebtedness. Actually, the available data underestimate the amount of 
debt, as they refer to all loans from institutions and to mortgage-backed loans from 
individuals. Therefore,  the unsecured loans from individuals (“junior” mortgages), 
which accounted for a sizeable share of total 40.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
series by Holt “Who benefited” p.284 and Williamson and Lindert American inequality Tab. 
5.13 and 5.14 
38 Shideler, Farm crisis pp.36-52, Johnson “Post-war optimism” 
39 Data on debt Historical Statistics series K361 and K376-K380, net personal savings 
Historical Statistics series F 547, both deflated with prices received by farmers (series K 344), 
gross output estimate by the author (Federico “The growth”).  
40 The main, official, mortgage usually amounted to about half the value of the farm, while 
these “junior” mortgages, backed with personal promissory short-term notes, could supply up 
to a further 40% in some cases (Johnson “Post-war optimism” pp.184-185).  
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Source: see footnote ??  
 
 Yet, the increase in debt was really impressive: from 1919 to 1921 the total debt 
(graph 4) increased by 45% in nominal terms and by 156% in real terms. Farmers 
reduced their net wealth for a variety of purposes (including the speculation on pure-
bred animals) but mainly for purchasing land. There are no data on transactions, but 
the boom is shown by the price increase. From 1918 to 1921, nominal prices of land 
increased by a third and real ones by 61.5% 41. Clearly, the post-war boom deceived 
farmers, admittedly at a time when forming realistic expectations on future profits 
was exceedingly difficult. The 1921 crisis dramatically worsened their financial 
conditions. Real interest rates jumped to almost 50% and interest payments, on 
                                                 
41 Nominal value of land from Lindert “Long-run trends” tab.1 deflated with prices received by 
farmers (Historical statistics series K 344). These yearly figures are unadjusted for the quality 
change related to the westward expansion. Lindert does provide adjusted figures, but only at 
ten-year intervals, and therefore unsuitable for a short-term analysis. The bias from the use of 
yearly data is anyway very small: from 1915 to 1930 unadjusted real prices fell by 39.2% and 
adjusted ones by 36.9%.  
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mortgage-backed loans only, to 16.6% of farmers’ income 42. Adding payments on 
other mortgages, the total burden might have exceeded a quarter of total income 43. 
Last but not least, farmers incurred also huge capital losses: the nominal price of land 
fell by almost 30% from 1921 to 1922.  
 During the 1920s, the stock of nominal debt and the interest/income ratio decreased 
slowly but steadily: by 1929, the debt was 13% lower in nominal and 25% lower in 
real terms than eight years before. However, this reduction was brought about almost 
exclusively by foreclosures, which increased from 3.2‰ of farms in 1913-1920 to 
10.7‰ in 1921-1925 and to 17.7‰ in 1926-1929 44. In fact the outstanding debt had 
fallen by a total of 2.4 billions current dollars, while according to Goldsmith, 
foreclosures had wiped out 2.8 billions of debt. 45 Thus farmers still in business were 
heavily indebted: on the eve of the Great Depression the debt/output ratio, inclusive of 
the unsecured loans from individuals, might have been around 125% and the 
interest/income one around a sixth. These are nationwide averages, but the level of 
indebtedness varied a lot across the country – roughly increasing from East to West 46. 
In other words, many American farmers were still haunted by the hang-over of the 
1921 boom and bust and this may have been an important source of weakness once 
the storm broke.  
  
III.3  Farmers’ indebtedness and the Great Depression 
 The negative effect of indebtedness on the farmers’ conditions during the Great 
Depression (the first of the three conditions) is hardly controversial. The nominal 
                                                 
42 Interest on mortgages Historical Statistics series K 372, income series K 284, plus interest 
payments. Cf. on the credit crunch Shideler Farm crisis pp.52-58 and for the policy of the 
Federal Reserve Metzler A history pp. 114-115 
43 This figure is estimated assuming that not-secured loans paid the same interest rate as 
mortgage-backed ones. This is a conservative estimate (Clarke Regulation tab.3.1). The total 
stock of debt is computed assuming that un-secured loans from individuals amounted to 
some 25% of the known total. This figure is hypothesized somewhat higher than the 
corresponding share in the 1970s (15% according to Historical Statistics p.478), taking into 
account the estate boom of the 1920s and the wide resort to promissory notes to finance it 
(cf. footnote ?? ).    
44 Alston “Farm foreclosures” tab.1 and Goldsmith A study tab. M 27. The data include also 
distress sale without formal procedure.  
45  From 1922 to 1929, the total financial assets remained constant (+ 9 millions only), tax 
arrears increased by 110 millions, while mortgage-backed debts fell by 1.1 billions and other 
debts fell by 1.3 billions (Goldsmith A study tabs M 28, A-53 and A-54 and A.65). The source 
reports  figures at 1930 prices, which are converted in current prices with the index of prices 
received by farmers (Historical Statistics series K 344). The author estimates the total value of 
debt on foreclosed farm assuming that each mortgage amounted to three-quarters of the 
average one. 
46 Alston “Farm foreclosures”, tab.2, Hamilton  “The causes” 
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stock of debt did fall somewhat from the pre-crisis level, but much less than gross 
output – so that debt/output ratio doubled (Table 5). The financial conditions of 
farmers worsened dramatically: real interest rates soared, interests gobbled a growing 
share of income and foreclosures (with some lag) increased to unprecedented heights  
47  As column d.2) shows, farmers’ real income would have fallen “only” by 18% 
instead of by almost 30% if they had not to pay any interest (column d.1). Alston 
shows that the percentage of foreclosures from 1926 to 1940 by state was positively 
related to the percentage of mortgaged farms: a 10% increase in this latter increased 
the average rate of foreclosure rate by 1.4‰, i.e. by a 7.5% at the average 48.  
 The effect of the farmers’ financial plight on the banking system depended, ceteris 
paribus, on the share of credit to agriculture on the banks’ total assets. From this point 
of view, the situation of the banking system as a whole was not so troublesome. In 
fact most mortgages had been subscribed by individuals, insurance companies and 
other non-banking institutions, and, as said, a lot of capital had been supplied by 
individuals with “junior mortgages” 49.  By 1929 assets of “commercial” banks 
included 1 billion dollars for secured loans and 2.6 billions for unsecured loans to 
farmers – small sums if compared with the total assets of banking system (62 billion 
$) and also with those of  “state [chartered] commercial banks” (some 34 billion), 
which included rural banks. 50 There are no data on assets by location of banks, but it 
is highly likely that credit to farmers was mainly held by rural banks and that it 
accounted for a sizable share of their assets. Rural banks were very vulnerable to 
agricultural crisis. Most states did not allow them to open branches, and thus to 
diversify their assets, and on top of this they had no right of support from the Federal 
Reserve 51. In case of foreclosure, the bank was bound to lose even if it could find a 
buyer for the farm. For instance, in 1933 the nominal price of land was about a third 
                                                 
47 These figures are subject to a contrasting bias. They understate the burden of interests as 
they omit non mortgage-backed loans and they overstate the burden, as they neglect interest 
rate delinquency, which was on the contrary quite diffused.  
48 Alston ”Farm foreclosures”. The rate of foreclosures was also positively related to the fall in 
income and to the extent of the previous land boom (measured with the increase in improved 
acreage from 1910 to 1925 and the increase in land prices from 1900 to 1912). 
49 By 1929, “individual and others” accounted for 47% of secured loans, insurance companies 
for 22%,  Federal land banks, state credit agencies and joint-stock land banks (monitored and 
guaranteed by the state) for 20% and “commercial” banks for only 10% (including a tiny 1%  
for mutual saving banks) Goldsmith A study tab A-61 and A-62.  
50 Historical Statistics series X 684, less assets of private banks (series X 686). The total 
assets of “non-national banks”, which included also mutual savings, totalled 45 billion – 10.4 
of which on (urban and rural) real estate (Historical Statistics series X 657 and 658).  
51 Cf. Alston, “Why do banks”, White Regulation pp. 14-17 and 127-132.  
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of its 1920-1921 peak. In other words a bank which had lent a farmer half the value of 
its farm in 1920-1921 was bound to lose, on average, about 14% of its assets if it 
foreclosed in 1933. But rural banks were also subject to interest delinquency before 
seizure and fall in deposits. There are no data on the former, although likely to have 
been quite common, as many institutions resorted to foreclosure only as an extreme 
ratio52 The total deposits of farmers (surely most held in rural banks) fell from 2.9 
billion $ in 1929 to 1.6 in 1933 53.  All these blows can account for the high mortality 
among “state [chartered] banks”:  from 1930 to 1933 some 6865 of them, two out of 
five operating in 1929, failed. The rate of failure for the other categories of banks was 
“only” about 25% 54.  
 Thus, the two first conditions are established well enough: the crisis did jeopardize 
the financial situation of farmers and, as a consequence, of rural banks. The real 
question is to what extent the financial troubles of rural banks affected the rest of the 
banking system and the economy at large. Friedman and Schwartz, consistently with 
their overall interpretation, opt for a strong exogeneity: the 1930 panic was “neither 
foreseeable nor inevitable” and it was not a consequence of a worsening in the 
“quality of loans”. They state  that “a contagion of fear spread among depositors, 
starting from the agricultural areas, which had experienced the heaviest impact of 
bank failures in the 1920s”55. They do not pursue this hint, focusing instead on the 
case of the Bank of the United States, a New York bank with large loans in real estate. 
However, it is not difficult to hypothesize that an unanticipated fall in prices or 
perhaps a poor crop convinced depositors in some agricultural areas that the local 
bank could not sustain the farmers’ losses, starting the panic. How much plausible is 
this scenario? Elmus Wicker, in his book on The banking panics of the Great 
Depression strongly downplays the relevance of the 1930 panic for the Depression 
and above all barely quotes agriculture. He blames the failure of Caldwell and Co, a 
Tennessee bank, which had overextended itself in a purchasing spree, while the 
subsequent waves of panic in 1931 and 1933 originated in big cities (Chicago and 
                                                 
52 Alston, “Farm foreclosure moratorium” 
53 Goldsmith A study tab. A 53. These figures estimate and include the deposit to other 
institutions. In the 1920s a lot of discussion about competition by city banks, but unclear if so 
large.. 
54  Historical Statistics series X 580, X 683 and X 685 for the number of banks in 1929 and X 
741 and X 743 for the number of failed banks. Cf. Hamilton From new day pp. 148-165 for the 
hesitant and ultimately failed attempts to help to the distressed banks. 
55 Friedman and Schwartz A monetary history p.308. 
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Detroit), with the co-operation of the devaluation of sterling 56. Wicker’s account 
would thus relieve agriculture of any responsibility for the “origin” of banking panics. 
D. Hamilton disagrees, arguing that the failure of Caldwell and Co accounted for a 
small share of total bankruptcies. He stresses the general weakness of rural banks and 
role of falling prices and of the drought, which hit many Southern states in 193057. 
Such a conflicting assessment is not surprising: by definition, the hypothesis of strong 
exogeneity is difficult to prove, or disprove, conclusively.  
 On the other hand, some econometric papers suggest a weak exogeneity, by showing 
a positive relationship between the rate of bank failure and measures of agricultural 
distress and indebtedness. Alston et al show that in the 1920s agricultural distress, 
measured by the rate of foreclosures, had been the main determinant of differences 
among states in the rate of bank failures58. Temin finds that the share of income from 
cotton and wheat on state GDP was positively related to the banking crisis in 1930 
and 1931 – but not in 1929 59. In a short paper, Thies and Gerlowski show that the 
share of failed banks was positively related to the proportion of real estate loans on 
their assets in 1927-1929 and 1930-32, but not in earlier periods 60. The effect is 
reinforced if the variable is interacted with indexes of the borrowers’ distress such as 
the share of foreclosed farms or the change in land prices. Unfortunately, none of 
these results is really conclusive. Alston’s work refers to the 1920s, Temin uses an 
indirect measure of distress, while Thies and Gerlowski do not discriminate between 
panic and not panic periods and consider all real estate loans, not just agricultural 
ones, in the denominator of their key explicative variable 61.  
                                                 
56 Wicker “A reconsideration” and Banking panics pp.32-36 and pp.152-154. Cf. also Metzler 
A history pp.325-326 
57 Hamilton “The causes”. His view is indirectly supported by Hamilton’s results about price 
expectations (Hamilton “Was the deflation”). The less anticipated price falls were, the more 
likely that they triggered a panic. 
58 Alston et al “Why do banks” p. 421. Cf. also Wheelock “Regulation” on Kansas and Fisher 
American pp.199-210 
59 Temin Did monetary forces pp. 83-90. He uses several measures of crisis – number of 
failures, proportion of failed banks and so on. The concentration of failures in the South 
explains the strong effect of the variable share of cotton. The relationship is somewhat 
weaker for wheat, while, as said, wheat states had been the most hit by the wave of 
foreclosures of the 1920s. This geographical shift may have been a coincidence (or the 
consequence of the drought), but it might reflect also the effect of foreclosures, which had 
weeded out the weakest farmers in the wheat-growing states.  
60 Thies-Gerlowski “Bank capital”. The rate of failure is negatively related to the size of the 
banks. The regression omits all real variables – including the state income. Cf. also the similar 
results by White (“A reinterpretation”), whose sample however includes only national banks.  
61  Cf. on the role of loans to real estate in the Depression the very recent paper by 
Eichengreen and Mitchener “The Great Depression” pp.208-212. 
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 Summing up, also the evidence for the “monetary” story seems insufficient. The 
euphoria of the 1920s had saddled farmers with a huge debt, which greatly reduced 
their strength to weather the fall in nominal prices ten years later. The agricultural 
crisis jeopardized the financial situation of the rural banks, and many of them failed. 
But it is quite difficult to prove the third condition – the existence of a causal link 
between the crisis of rural banks and the overall banking panic.  The best guess rules 
out a strong relation between the crisis in the countryside and the outbreak of the 1930 
panic. The poor conditions of rural banks are likely to have contributed to the overall 
financial crisis during the Depression, but their specific contribution is difficult to 
disentangle from the more general boom and bust in real estate.  
  
  IV) Conclusion: why did agricultural prices fall during the Depression? 
  Relative agricultural prices did fall dramatically in almost all countries during the 
Great Depression (Table 1), while world agricultural production remained roughly 
constant (Table 3). In the conventional wisdom, these trends would be quite easy to 
explain as a dramatic consequence of the long-term disequilibrium, but as Table 4 
shows, there is even less evidence of overproduction after the outbreak of the crisis 
than before. How can the price fall be squared with the no-disequilibrium scenario? 
There are three possible answers to this question. 
 i) The Total Factor Productivity may have grown faster in agriculture than in the rest 
of the economy. This hypothesis seems highly unlikely, in spite of the acceleration of 
agricultural TFP growth after the war relative to pre-war years. The implicit gap in 
TFP growth rates among sector must have been implausibly large and anyway the 
available data suggest that from 1929 to 1937 TFP grew more slowly in agriculture 
than in the rest of the economy 62. Thus, if any, productivity trends caused relative 
prices of agricultural products to rise.  
 ii) The supply of banking services (à la Bernanke) might have fallen more in the rural 
areas than in the rest of the economy, as a consequence of the higher rate of failures. 
In this case, farmers had to resort to city banks, which, given informational 
asymmetries and the poor reputation of agriculture, rationed credit and/or charged 
                                                 
62 The TFP growth of farming from 1929 to 1937 (0.8%) was the lowest among the main 
sectors of the American economy according to Kendrick (Productivity trends tab.34). In a 
recent paper, Field (“The most technologically progressive”) argues that Kendrick’s figures 
underestimate non-farm productivity growth. Cf. for further data on productivity growth in 
agriculture Federico Feeding the world chap.5  
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high real interest rates 63. The increase in transaction costs would show up in a 
widening gap between prices received by farmers and (urban) wholesale prices of 
agricultural products. Indeed in the United States, the former did decline a little more 
than the latter, but the difference is too small to account for more than a minimal 
proportion of the fall in agricultural prices 64. It is a fortiori even less plausible that 
this effect extended to other countries, where agriculture was less dependent on credit. 
 iii) The third, and most plausible, hypothesis focuses on the asymmetry between 
agriculture and the rest of the economy. Agriculture was a competitive sector, and in 
the peculiar conditions of the Depression its elasticity of supply was bound to be low. 
In fact the opportunity cost of farmers’ labor was extremely low, as it depended on the 
expected wages in other sectors. Real wages were rising, but the high rate of 
unemployment made the prospect of emigration to cities hardly attractive 65. Thus 
farmers were likely to go on producing as long as revenues covered their variable 
costs plus a minimum income for the purchases of indispensable consumer goods. In 
this situation, demand shocks caused prices to fall. In contrast, in the rest of the 
economy demand shocks caused a fall in output because prices were sticky. A long 
interpretative tradition, dating back to Keynes and revived by some  recent works, 
attribute this feature to wage stickiness, determined by the power of trade unions, by 
the existence of welfare benefits or by the existence of long-term labor contracts 66. In 
contrast, Madsen, in two very recent contributions, argues that prices of industrial 
goods were sticky because competition in manufacturing was limited 67.  
  To sum up, this article largely exonerates agriculture from the allegation to have 
been responsible of the Depression. The acquittal is complete for the charge of 
“overproduction” in the “real” story, and likely for the “monetary” story. The message 
                                                 
63 Cf. for some evidence of the insufficient supply of credit to agriculture and for the measures 
to increase it Hamilton, From new day pp.153-162. Bernanke (Essays pp. 55-56) downplays 
the possibility of a negative effect of the contraction in banking services on investments 
because big corporations could finance their investments with their funds. This argument, 
however, does not apply to cash-strapped farmers. 
64 From 1929 to 1932, prices received by farmers fell by 41.5%, while wholesale prices of 
farm products by 38.2% (Historical Statistics series K 344 and E42). The fall might reflect 
productivity improvements in transportation and marketing.   
65  The yearly net migration from countryside (Historical Statistics series C 78) to cities totaled 
0.63 millions from 1921 to April 1930 and  0.64 from 1934 to 1939, while only 61000 in 1931. 
From April 1931 to April 1933, 3.0 million people left farms and 3.74 returned, with a net 
immigration of  763000 persons.  
66 Cf. e.g. among the many works Bernanke Essays Bordo-Erceg-Evans (“Money”) and the 
discussion by Cole-Ohanian (“The Great Depression” pp. 19-21), Kehoe and Prescott 
(“Introduction”) pp. 12-13 and Madsen (“The length”) pp. 239-241 
67 Madsen “Prices and wages” and “The length” 
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of the paper is clear: in spite of their reckless borrowing spree during the 1919-1921 
boom, farmers were more a victim of the Depression than a culprit for it.   
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Tab . 1 
Trends in relative prices, countries of the “Atlantic” economy 
         a)        b)     c)       d)    e) 
Terms of trade      
Argentina -24.7 14 -14.2 -44.2 1.15 ns 
Uruguay 25.8 -21.8 -1.5 -25.9 -3.00 ns 
Australia  -7 -11.2 -17.4 -30.6 -1.17 ns 
Canada -10.2 13.6 2 -37.0 -0.03 ns 
UK -21.7 10.9 -13.2 -15.5 -0.91 ns 
Denmark -11.6 -10.1 -20.5 -40.7 -1.70 ns 
Sweden -4.6 9.5 4.5 -14.3 0.52 ns 
Finland 14.2 9.8 25.4 -23.4    1.65 ** 
Ireland -23.8 7.1 -18.3 -18.4   -1.16  * 
France -27.6 31.9 -4.6 Increase -1.04 ns 
Germany -6.3 -2.9 -9.1 -20.8 -0.52 *** 
Spain -2.1 11.8 9.5 -11.2 0.38 ns 
Italy -11 -1 -11.9 -17.9 -1.20 ns 
      
Real prices     
Denmark -1.3 -16.6 -17.8 -37.4   -1.33 ns 
France -12.4 18.1 3.4 Increase   -0.36 ns 
UK 5.8 -2.1 3.6 -5.4    0.07 ns 
Italy -0.3 -6.2 -6.5 -20.3   -1.02 ns 
Uruguay 14.1 -11.5           1.0 -4.2   -1.50 ns 
Canada -14.7 13.1 -3.5 -32.2   -0.16 ns 
Spain -1.7 3.4 1.7 -13.3   0.15 ns 
Germany   -13.3 -15.7  
 
 a) 1911-13 to 1920-22; b) 1920-22 to 1927-29; c) 1911-13 to 1927-29; d) 1929 to Depression trough68; 
e) growth rate, 1910 to 1929 (ns not significantly different from zero; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%) 
Source: Federico 2005 Statistical Appendix tab III 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68 The trough of the terms of trade was reached in 1931 in Australia, in 1932 in Argentina, 
Canada, Denmark, Germany and the United States,  in 1933 in the United Kingdom, Sweden, 
Finland, Ireland, Spain and Italy and in  1934 in Uruguay; that of real prices in 1932 in 
Denmark, Germany and the United States, in 1933 in Italy and Spain, in 1935 in Uruguay and 
the United Kingdom. 
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Tab.2 
Gross agricultural output, 1913=100 
 
 World    Areas     
 Total   League USA Europe North-WesternWestern Atlantic
 output Crops livestock Nations   Europe Settlement economy
          
1911-13 103,4 102,5 102,5  100,6 105,6 102,6 101,2 102,4 
          
1920 93,0 92,4 93,0 89,5 96,1 86,8 90,0 97,4 96,6 
1921 97,6 96,9 99,0 89,5 107,7 87,8 93,7 106,1 101,4 
1922 102,6 101,9 103,3 99,3 106,4 95,0 99,3 107,7 105,0 
1923 104,3 102,8 105,9 103,0 108,4 98,5 98,9 110,6 107,3 
1924 108,5 106,2 111,0 106,7 111,6 101,9 104,3 115,1 111,7 
1925 112,7 110,8 114,0 115,3 111,9 110,9 107,4 115,8 113,9 
1926 113,5 110,7 117,2 115,3 116,2 109,4 102,3 118,7 113,5 
1927 117,3 114,1 119,8 118,9 120,0 114,7 109,2 122,1 118,4 
1928 119,7 116,2 123,0 122,6 114,3 119,9 116,7 118,3 119,6 
1929 123,8 120,6 127,0 122,6 119,2 126,0 120,9 120,4 123,8 
1930 120,1 117,2 125,3 125,1 114,6 119,9 115,5 118,2 117,5 
1931 121,7 118,0 125,9 123,8 120,9 121,0 120,4 123,2 123,4 
1932 121,9 118,6 123,3 121,4 118,6 121,7 123,9 121,9 125,6 
1933 123,8 120,5 123,8 126,3 122,0 124,3 128,2 123,3 126,1 
1934 123,1 119,2 123,6 123,8 114,4 126,8 133,0 116,8 126,6 
1935 121,8 117,9 122,9 126,3 104,9 127,5 128,9 108,7 122,7 
1936 121,6 118,2 124,9 130,0 115,1 120,6 126,3 116,3 120,9 
1937 128,1 123,8 127,5 142,2 112,5 133,3 128,6 114,9 124,4 
 
World: Argentina, Australia, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Finland, 
Germany, Greece, India, Indonesia Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, United States, USSR and Uruguay; Europe Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, USSR, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom; North-Western Europe the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Denmark, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Finland, Switzerland; Asia Japan, India, Indonesia; Western 
Settlement Canada, Australia and the United States; Atlantic Economy:  Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay 
 
Source Federico 2004 and League of Nations 1938-1939 
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Tab.3 
Growth in input, selected countries 
 Ca 1910 Ca 1920 Ca 1930 
a) Land    
Canada 15.6 25.1 30.5 
USA 140.4 162.6 166.9 
Australia     6.1 9.3° 13.4* 
b) Labor    
Argentina  1.05 1.35  1.54 
Canada  0.96 1.04 1.13 
USA  11.77 10.79 10.56 
Australia   0.48 0.53 0.59 
Argentina  1.05 1.35  1.54 
France  8.73 7.21 6.39 
Germany 10.7 9.8 9.3 
Italy 10.7 11.2 10.5 
UK 1.50 1.43 1.35 
c) Capital    
Germany 100 99.1$ 106.8 
Italy 100 106.5 119.6 
UK 100 93.1   92.2 
USA 100 116.4 105.9 
Source: Federico (2005) tabs. 4.1, 4.3, 4.7 and 4.16 
Land: millions ha arable and tree crops; labor: millions of workers (males and females); capital: index 
of stock (different definitions) at constant prices 
°1925-26; *1938; $ 1925 
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Tab. 4 
Potential demand and overproduction in the “Atlantic”  economy 
 a) b) c) d) e) f) 
1911 1 1 1 1 1 1 
       
1919 102.8      
1920 106.6 0.906 0.876 0.915 0.923 1.028 
1921 106.3 0.954 0.878 0.968 0.968 0.989 
1922 111.8 0.939 0.926 0.957 0.993 1.014 
1923 115.9 0.925 0.926 0.943 1.002 0.960 
1924 119.3 0.936 0.932 0.945 1.031 1.019 
1925 122.8 0.928 0.979 0.936 1.041 1.015 
1926 125.8 0.902 0.955 0.909 1.027 1.071 
1927 129.0 0.917 0.961 0.924 1.060 1.068 
1928 130.9 0.914 0.977 0.913 1.062 1.129 
1929 135.3 0.915 0.945 0.918 1.090 1.204 
1930 133.2 0.882 0.979 0.896 1.025 0.980 
1931 131.4 0.939 0.983 0.979 1.068 1.022 
1932 127.7 0.984 0.991 1.038 1.080 1.000 
1933 129.4 0.975 1.018 1.031 1.078 1.083 
1934 132.8 0.953 0.973 0.998 1.075 0.994 
1935 136.2 0.901 0.967 0.933 1.035 0.930 
1936 140.2 0.862 0.967 0.878 1.016 0.906 
1937 144.9 0.858 1.024 0.874 1.036 0.816 
1938 148.2 0.886 0.966 0.920 1.086 0.905 
 
a) Atlantic demand, baseline estimate; b) ratio of Atlantic production (tab.2) to the baseline estimate; d) 
ratio of Atlantic production (tab.2) to lower bound estimate; e) ratio of world production according to 
the League of Nations (Memorandum) to Atlantic demand, baseline simulation; f) ratio of Atlantic 
wheat output to Atlantic demand  
Sources: see text  
 
 
 
Tab.5 
Financial conditions of American farmers during the Great Depression 
 a) b) c) d.1) d.2) e) 
1926-1928 7.7 112.4 10.1   16.8 
1929 6.0 108.0 9.3 4.2 3.4 15.7 
1930 21.5 130.5 12.6 -11.0 -9.0 18.7 
1931 36.6 169.6 19.2 -18.3 -11.6 28.4 
1932 29.5 212.1 27.3 -28.8 -17.7 38.8 
1933 -1.7 175.0 17.2 -5.5 0.6 28 
1934 -19.2 133.9 11.2 6.0 7.0 21 
 a) real interest rate (interest rates Historical Statistics 1975 series K371, price changes K 344); b) debt/ 
gross output (debt Goldsmith 1955 tab. M-27, output Federico 2004); c) interests on loans/farm income 
(interests Historical Statistics 1975 K 372 and farm income Historical statistics 1975  K 284); d) 
change in real income since 1926-1928 at 1913 prices (deflated with K 344): d.1) actual data and d.2) 
counterfactual (no interest) series; e) foreclosure per one thousand farms (Goldsmith 1955 tab.M-28) 
 
 
 
